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Executive Summary 
 
The United States public post-secondary education system varies in its reliance on state 
support. Some states have a historic predisposition to a private post-secondary education 
sector, while others have a tradition of strong public institutions. In all cases, public post-
secondary relies on state revenue for their general operating and capital budgets. 
Effective operation in the current fiscal environment requires a clear understanding of 
different factors affecting a state’s funding level and the challenges presented in periods 
of slow economic growth.  
 
Over the past six years, higher education, on average, saw positive growth in state 
support. However, impressive increases in support throughout the early part of the decade 
are the primary reason for the positive change in funding over the entire period. To a 
certain extent, the growth was stymied by considerable funding cuts in fiscal years 2008-
2010 as states were forced to make expenditure cuts as a result of the recession.  
 
In 2008, the United States felt the full weight of the looming economic recession. The 
financial markets crumpled with the collapse of major financial players and the over-
leveraged sub-prime market. Five months later, in an effort to aid states in the upcoming 
budget cycle, the federal government passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA). One component of ARRA was the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, which 
allocated resources to K-12 and higher education under strict federal and state guidelines.  
 
The research presented here focuses on the central state higher education authority and 
the budget appropriations request mechanism used during the state budget process and 
the impact each variable has on funding trends for higher education. The research and 
analysis provide state policy makers with necessary information to operate in a post-
stimulus fiscal environment.  
 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the state higher education agency structure and the 
total higher education appropriation from the state? 
 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the higher education appropriations request 
mechanism and the level of funding they receive from the state? 
 
The study suggests that while agency structure does not have an effect on the change in 
appropriations from 2005-2010 and 2008-2010, the nature of the appropriations request 
mechanism does have an effect. Further, the change in total state general fund spending 
affects higher education expenditure levels in a recession.  
 
The study adds another contributing factor to a body of research focusing on elements 
affecting higher education finance. This study does not imply that one mechanism is 
superior to another for any given state. Each state has a unique set of factors that affect 
the amount of state support higher education receives.  
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Introduction 
 In September 2008, the S&P 500 peaked at 1561.8. In the following months, with 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, AIG, and the sub-prime mortgage market, the United 
States’ economy took a dive and the S&P bottomed out at 683.38 in March of 2009. In an 
effort to stave off greater economic disaster, the federal government crafted key 
legislation aimed at stabilizing the economy and supporting state lawmaker’s efforts to 
maintain important state programs.  
 The 111th Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA/Recovery Act) in February 2009. Colloquially referred to as the states’ stimulus, 
the mission of ARRA was just that – to assist states through difficult budget times, 
stimulate the economy, and, in part, make a considerable one-time investment in 
education spending. Through a set of guiding principles such as student and family 
assistance, research funding, infrastructure building, job training, and state fiscal relief, 
the ARRA made a significant short-term difference in how states are surviving this 
difficult fiscal period.  
 Even with considerable federal investment in individual state economies, 
forecasters are concerned that recovery will not happen quickly enough. Without 
considerable increases in tax revenue levels, states face a financial cliff at the end of the 
Recovery Act. States will face the task of funding programs accustomed to historically 
high levels of support with substantially less state revenue. Additionally, the challenge of 
replacing one-time funds with recurring state dollars will be present for state programs 
where the Recovery Act funds represented a substantial portion of revenue over the last 
year.  
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 This paper takes a bilateral approach to examining higher education fiscal policy 
during the current economic recession. The first approach examines previous inquiries on 
state financial management during past recessions, the nature of state tax revenue cycles, 
and the Recovery Act funds. The second approach examines the effect state agency types, 
appropriations request mechanisms, and other state characteristics have on state fiscal 
policy and higher education. Testing the effect of state characteristics on higher education 
finance and understanding the state fiscal climate provide critical information to the post-
secondary sector on what type of environment to expect in a post-stimulus era.  
State Involvement in Higher Education  
 Over the past two centuries, higher education policy has been influenced by 
changes in the central state agency, fiscal support for institutions and programs, state and 
federal political involvement, institutional mission directives, and public opinion. Due to 
the relative high-level production in states with a strong post-secondary sector, a 
comprehensive system of higher education is a major resource for economic 
development, a method for improving quality of life, and reducing expenditures in 
corrections and healthcare. 
 Religious institutions supported many of the nation’s first colleges and 
universities, while state legislative involvement traditionally occurred through land grant 
apportionment. It was not until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that 
states began providing financial support for these institutions (Heller, 50). Quasi-public 
institutions, named so for the financial support they received from state legislatures and 
the general autonomy granted to their Boards of Trust, opened throughout the South and 
Midwest in the late eighteenth century. This was the general trend for the establishment 
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of institutions until the nineteenth century when state legislatures began retaining 
appointment power over trustees for each college or university. It was not until 1819, 
with the chartering of the University of Virginia, that the first state university was 
established.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the widespread 
development of statewide coordinating and governing systems led to a major expansion 
of state control of the public post-secondary sector. There were a variety of structures 
passed due to the different strengths and political powers within the individual states 
(Heller, 52).  
 A study by Cohen and March (1986) classified higher education goals in two 
categories: those that benefit the student and those that benefit society (Heller, 54). 
Today, the most widely accepted public benefits of higher education are the economic 
and societal improvement factors. Advanced degree holders tend to earn higher wages 
over a lifetime, which increases the tax base for the state. The aforementioned social 
improvements in healthcare and corrections lower expenditures for a state (Heller, 55). 
Thus, state policy favorable to public post-secondary education provides a myriad of 
individual and societal benefits that transcend improvement specific to the education 
sector.  
State Fiscal Crisis 
State budgets, programs, and state supported agencies like higher education are 
taking a major hit from the current economic crisis. The Center for Budget Policy and 
Priorities (CBPP) collected aggregated state fiscal data on revenue shortfalls as a 
proportion of general fund expenditures and projected shortfalls for the mid-2010 fiscal 
year and FY2011. Table 1 shows a collection of states with a difficult fiscal challenge 
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over the next year and a half. The entire sample and associated data can be seen in Table 
1A of the Appendix.   
Alaska, Florida, and Utah saw the greatest change in spending as a percentage of the 
general fund in FY 2008-10 (column 1). The most alarming statistic is the 2010 revenue 
shortfalls as a percentage of the state general fund (column 2), when the majority of states 
in the sample face a double-digit shortfall. Additionally, the CBPP projected a FY2010 
mid-year shortfall for most states (column 3). States with double-digit gaps include: 
Arizona, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Virginia. The final 
column in Table 1 lists the projected revenue shortfalls for each state in FY2011, which is 
the first year without education expenditure support from the State Fiscal Stabilization 
Fund. Illinois, Nevada, and Vermont face considerable projected shortfalls for FY2011 
and without aid from Recovery Act funds, state supported institutions of higher education 
will be affected. Because of the impending funding cliff, states such as Arizona, Illinois, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode Island, will see double-digit revenue shortfalls and be forced 
to make serious cutbacks in state spending.  
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act & State Fiscal Stabilization Fund 
The Congressional Budget Office 
reported “$49 billion [of ARRA] would be 
outlaid to states and localities by the Federal 
government in fiscal year 2009” (GAO 
Report, 4). Of this spending, the nine 
programs listed in Table 2 are estimated to 
represent 87 percent of ARRA expenditures at 
the time of the report. 
The majority of education expenditures from the ARRA originate with the State 
Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) - the primary focus of this research. Representing 
approximately $53.6 billion in federal support to the states, the function of the SFSF is to 
assist states in stabilizing their budgets “by minimizing budgetary cuts in education and 
other essential government services such as public safety” (GAO Report, 27). As the 
chief steward of the SFSF, the US Department of Education allocated 81.8 percent of the 
fund for education stabilization purposes and the remaining 18.8 percent for a 
government services fund (GAO Report, 27).  
In order to receive SFSF funding, states must meet a list of federal requirements 
and put forth effort and funding toward: increasing teacher effectiveness, address inequity 
in teacher quality distribution, create and maintain a P-16 data system for tracking student 
progress, create college and career ready standards for all children, provide support for 
schools requiring reorganization or restructuring, build a transparent and accountable 
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system to measure efficiency and effectiveness, and a Maintenance of Effort (MOE) 
clause (GAO Report, 28). 
Each state’s MOE requires FY2006 funding levels to be maintained throughout 
the life of the stimulus. If maintained in both K-12 and post-secondary education, SFSF 
funds should be applied to fulfilling a second MOE agreement at the FY2008 level. There 
is growing concern among state budget officers that the MOE requirement will bring 
harm than good to the state fiscal situation because states are unable to decrease 
education expenditures proportional to the total decrease in the state budget. This places 
significant financial burden at the end of the stimulus, which could lead to major 
cutbacks as states face the challenge of maintaining unsustainable levels of funding. 
In addition, higher education funds cannot be used to “increase endowments; 
modernize, renovate, or repair sports facilities, or maintaining equipment” (GAO Report, 
29). SFSF funds can aid in mitigating tuition increases, the modernization of academic 
facilities, as well as other general fund expenditures related to the goals of the ARRA. 
States were given additional latitude in creating further restrictions on SFSF usage in 
post-secondary education.  
Information gathered from the State Higher Education Executive Officers’ State 
Higher Education Finance report and Illinois State University’s Grapevine survey 
provide a fiscal context for higher education as it relates to state budget challenges and 
the Recovery Act.  
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The percent change in higher education funding over time and level of post-secondary 
education funding represented by Recovery Act funds is provided in Table 3. States with 
considerable changes are presented above, and information on all 43 states included in 
the sample can be found in Table 3A of the Appendix. The first two columns list the 
percent change in higher education appropriations from the state and do not include 
tuition revenue and local support. Nationally, the support for higher education has grown 
over the five-year period. The third and forth columns show negative appropriations 
changes from FY2008-10, which indicates that growth over the five-year period is 
primarily due to substantial growth from 2005-2007. The positive growth could be a 
function of low funding for higher education in the earliest part of the sample, which 
would make large growth margins achievable.  
Literature Review 
Economic Implications for Higher Education 
  Providing a historical context for state fiscal behavior in recessionary cycles, 
White (1978) examined the change in state tax revenue structures, the effect those 
changes had on the availability of total state revenue, and the effect those changes had on 
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state support for higher education. Early state tax structures relied heavily on property tax 
revenue, which provided a relatively stable supply of income that was not as susceptible 
to ups and downs in economic productivity. However, changes in state tax policy led to 
the adoption of new, more responsive, tax structures. As state revenue sources shifted to 
more elastic tax sources like a state income tax, the state’s revenue become more reliant 
on short-run business cycles (White, 180). As a result, state revenue grows during 
economic prosperity and shrinks with slow economic activity, by extension, support for 
state programs like higher education does as well.  
White used the recession of the 1970s as a case study for state fiscal behavior and 
higher education. He concluded similar practices to those we see today in state 
prioritization of expenditures during a recession: states focus on social support programs 
like Medicaid, welfare, and K-12 education by reducing expenditures elsewhere. Higher 
education took a disproportionate share of the cuts because of the relative flexibility in 
budgets for higher education, which is similar to views many state legislators hold today 
(White, 183). His theory leaves open the question of whether state governing agencies, to 
which some state appropriations are made, affects the entire appropriations process.  
More recently, Hovey (1999) and the National Center for Public Policy and 
Higher Education created fiscal forecasts for higher education support in the coming 
decade (1999-2009). Noting the favorable fiscal environment when conducting his 
research, Hovey concluded that states would have a difficult time funding higher 
education at current levels over the next decade due to slow growth in state and local 
revenue. He considers the growth in enrollment rates as the primary culprit of higher 
education expenditures growing faster than state revenue (Hovey, 10).  
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 While White’s primary critique is related to income tax revenue, Hovey focuses 
on sales tax as the state’s primary resource for revenues, “as individual income rises, 
people spend a successively smaller proportion of incremental income on taxed goods 
and higher proportion on non-taxed outlays for services” (Hovey, 15). Even if state 
institutions responded as other state agencies, they would not be able to expand programs 
without cutbacks elsewhere and the steady annual revenue growth would remain 0.5 
percent lower than current service levels would require (Hovey, 19).   
 Just as White concluded, Hovey maintained that state legislators tend to treat 
higher education fiscal policy like other discretionary spending, which has led to higher 
education being disproportionately cut in times of slow economic growth and 
disproportionately awarded in times of strong economic growth. Hovey’s Balance Wheel 
approach is supported by the following legislative perceptions: 
- Institutions have separate budgets with reserves to absorb fiscal adversity. 
- Institutions can address budget changes through employee pay changes. 
- Institutions have more flexibility to vary spending levels. 
- Institutions have other revenue sources such as tuition and fees (Hovey, 30). 
Therefore, the perceived flexibility that higher education enjoys is a factor in legislative 
appropriation negotiations. Hovey concludes his analysis by stating that central fiscal 
authorities do not have the opportunity to impact how appropriated money is spent at 
individual institutions (Hovey, 32). This hypothesis leaves open the possibility that a 
central state fiscal agent for higher education, such as a governing board, might affect 
expenditure behavior on an institutional level, which could impact the state level 
appropriations process.  
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 An agency’s ability to effectively operate in a policy environment depends on 
political relationships, information symmetry, and the selection process of higher 
education policy makers, each of which are affected by the structure of the state agency. 
Waller and colleagues postulate that in “economic downturns, some state officials 
propose governance change in response to high university costs and declining state 
revenues” (Knott, 3). A governing board may play a significant role in the selection of 
institutional executives, or a state executive may play an influential role, either formally 
or informally, in the selection of a state institutions chief executive. These behavioral and 
relational factors tied to different board structures can affect a state agency’s ability to 
play an influential role in the political process.   
 Additional research points to an interaction between state policy agendas, 
institutional behavior and expenditures, and the structure of the state agency. In one case, 
a state’s board structure is a function of political factors (Toma, 1986). Follow-up 
research, published in 1989, argued, “individually governed public universities will 
behave more like private universities than will their counterparts that are centrally 
governed” (Toma, 1). Her conclusion is predicated upon a political battle for influence 
between multiple stakeholders: Faculty and staff, students, parents, administrators, and 
the general public, each with a different ability and opportunity to affect policy. Because 
there is a higher cost of access for the general public in a centralized system, educators 
experience greater ease in influencing the agenda. Institutions in a centralized system rely 
less on tuition revenue relative to state appropriations, tend to have a higher 
student/faculty ratio, and benefit from more tenured faculty. Centralized systems also 
present the opportunity for standardized rules, regulations, and outcomes. However, 
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product diversity diminishes, but ideally, one will begin to see a more efficient use of 
resources due to the more standardized system (Toma, 6). The propensity for more 
market interaction in a decentralized system leads to more diversity of available product 
and a varied level of output by each institution. Because institutions in a decentralized 
system tend to behave more like private institutions, they are more reactive to taxpayer 
demands and focus on input-output mixes. In either system, Toma concludes that 
structure does affect “the provision of higher education” (Toma, 7). This would suggest 
that changing to a more centralized structure in a state is related to the level of influence a 
stakeholder has in the political process.  
 Political interactions and the ability to secure state funds can differ with state 
agency structure. Lowry (2001) produced research suggesting a state with a more 
centralized board could lobby more effectively, which may lead to additional state 
support (Heller, 61). The opposite would be true in a decentralized structure as 
institutions lobby individually on their own behalf. Contrary to that, Knott (2001) 
concluded that a decentralized state agency positively affects the amount of resources and 
productivity at state universities. While previous research finds an interaction between 
state agency structure and policy considerations such as public agenda creation, fund 
allocation to institutions, and/or differing levels of political influence and interaction, it 
does not suggest whether state agency structure and the appropriations request 
mechanism affect the change in total state appropriations to higher education. The 
following research design will help answer that question. 
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Research Design 
 Knowing how state agency structure and the appropriations request mechanism 
interact with the level of state appropriations will provide important management insight 
to state agencies and institutions. The level of influence these variables have play a role 
in determining how state agencies manage through challenging economic conditions.  
RQ1: Is there a relationship between state higher education agency structure and the 
total higher education appropriation from the state? 
 States craft their higher education appropriations request in many different ways. 
Systems traditionally employ a base plus/minus, funding formula, or mixed approach to 
determine the budget proposal they make to the central fiscal agent. Each method has a 
different set of metrics that calculate the appropriations request. The way the mechanism 
prioritizes different changes in the higher education environment may affect the level of 
appropriations the state allocates.  
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the higher education appropriations request 
mechanism and the level of funding they receive from the state? 
 Understanding the affect these independent variables have in the state budget 
process can yield insight on a state’s ability to advocate and receive sufficient funds in a 
post-stimulus economy.  
 A multivariate regression model can examine the effect that agency structure and 
the appropriations mechanism have on the 5-year and 2-year funding change outlined 
below. The model will control for the size of the public post-secondary education sector 
and the enrollment change from 2004-2009.  
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Defining the Variables 
 The study uses the percent change in total state funding1
Coordinating Board: The authority of coordinating boards varies from state to 
state, but a common characteristic is the lack of corporate authority over post-
secondary institutions in the state. They typically plan the state’s public agenda 
and make budget recommendations for higher education. A few coordinating 
 for higher education 
from 2005-2010 as the dependent variable, which means each state will have a single 
observation for the entire sample (FY05-10) instead of annual estimates. The study uses 
the same variable type for the percent change in state funding from FY2008-10. By 
separating these two variables, the study observes funding behavior during strong 
economic growth and the current recession. 
 The Education Commission of the States released a report in 2003 on differences 
between state agency structures. Three broad categories were established on the basis of 
political influence, statutory authority, financial and personnel control, and program 
approval.  
Governing Board: Generally accepted as having the strongest statutory authority, 
a governing board is the most centralized of the three board categories. The 
general consistency among this board type is the authority over “personnel 
decisions, institutional operations, and corporate governance status” (SHEEO, 2). 
While there is greater statutory authority with a governing board, informal 
coordination can foster a cooperative environment and foster more effective 
policy advocacy.  
                                                        
1 The change in state funding is represented by state revenue only and does not include revenue from the State Fiscal 
Stabilization Fund. 
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boards have academic program approval and tuition setting authority (Kentucky 
Council on Postsecondary Education) while others operate state financial aid 
programs (Tennessee Higher Education Commission). The ability to informally 
coordinate, build partnerships, and advocate as an entire system provide the 
coordinating agency strength and support (SHEEO, 2).  
Planning or Regulatory Agency: As the statutorily weakest agency, planning or 
regulatory agencies “have limited or no formal coordinating or governing 
authority” (ECS, 15). The state of Delaware operates under this structure. 
Additional independent variables that may affect higher education funding levels 
are the different appropriations request mechanisms employed by a state’s central 
governing authority or state higher education agency. The State Higher Education 
Executive Officers (SHEEO) released a report in 2007 explaining the different 
appropriations mechanisms: Funding Formula, Base Plus/Minus, or a mixed variation of 
the two. 
Funding Formula: Formula requests are measured by fluctuating cost factors 
such as enrollment. They may include baseline enrollment changes in the 
aggregate student population, enrollment numbers by level of instruction, or 
comparisons to total peer state and institutional appropriations (SHEEO, 10). The 
formula can include non-instructional costs such as maintenance and operation 
revenue for new capital that has come online, performance and quality 
enhancements, and for major research projects. The primary difference for 
funding formula states is the use of these specific functions in order to determine 
funding levels. 
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Base Plus/Minus: Using the previous year’s funding as a starting point, the 
agency creating the appropriations request can make incremental changes to areas 
that require more funding: enrollment, faculty salaries, or maintenance and 
operations (SHEEO, 11). Additionally, like funding formulas, the base plus/minus 
technique can include benchmark comparisons for funding purposes. 
Mixed; Funding Formula or Base Plus/Minus: Some states in the data set 
indicated they have a mixed approach to constructing budget requests. Having 
indicated either funding formula or base plus/minus as the primary method in 
their mixed approach, some of the influences mentioned above were reiterated by 
those states indicating a mixed process.  
In the model, characteristics were preserved and coded appropriately. Selected state 
agencies are displayed in Table 4 above; the remaining sample can be viewed in Table 4A 
of the appendix.  
 The dataset contains 43 state observations with the characteristics described 
above. The study controlled for enrollment growth from 2004-09, the total number of 
public institutions in the state, and the percentage those public institutions represent in the 
total higher education sector. Additionally, the dataset includes the total change in 
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general fund spending over the two time periods (FY05-10 & FY08-10) to control for the 
total reduction in general fund spending for the state. Research indicated the affect 
political party affiliation has on funding levels; however, that variable was not included 
because the funding change is represented by a single percentage over a five-year period 
instead of annual changes. If the funding changes were annual, changes in party 
representation would be more valuable because election cycles and changes in authority 
can more closely align with funding changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average change in funding from FY2005-10 is roughly 16 percent indicating strong 
positive growth during that time. However, FY2008-10 saw an average decline of 6.2 
percent, which supports the theory of unstable funding patterns for higher education. 
North Dakota represents the 18.5 percent in revenue growth for FY2008-10; as an entire 
state, North Dakota continues to enjoy lucrative persistence throughout the recession. 
Results 
A multivariate regression analysis conducted on the change in funding from 
FY2005-10 and the change in funding from FY2008-10 yielded the following results. 
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Also included in the model was a robust calculation to adjust for heteroskedasticity. The 
agency structure was compared to a coordinating board type and showed no effect in the 
funding change from FY2005-10 of FY2008-10.  
However, the budget request mechanism did generate an effect on the level of 
higher education spending during the sample. Base Plus/Minus and the two mixed 
approaches rendered a smaller change in spending than the funding formula method. The 
model controls for enrollment change, which funding formula states indicated as a major 
calculation in their formula. Therefore, it is not simply enrollment accounting for the 
changes in funding formula states. The appropriations mechanism impacted the 5-year 
funding change. The analysis did not reflect a significant impact other state 
characteristics had on the change in funding.  
Past research indicated the total effects of reduced state spending on higher 
education; consequently, a second analysis was conducted on FY08-10 to measure 
specific effects on spending during the recession. The Base Plus/Minus and Mixed, 
Funding Formula methods remained significant at the .10 level. However, the percent 
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change in general fund spending had a substantial impact on higher education funding. 
This finding supports the theory that major decreases in state revenue adversely impact 
higher education funding.  
 In either analysis, the agency structure did not affect the change in state higher 
education funding. The budget request mechanism had a statistically significant impact 
on the change in state funding for higher education in both time frames. We can deduce 
that the mechanism plays a significant role in the budget process, but when states enter a 
recession, the total change in general fund spending has the most significant impact. 
While this is an expected behavior, each mechanism does decrease in significance, which 
indicates that even broad state appropriation mechanisms do not guarantee stable funding 
during a recession.  
Implications and Recommendations 
 The behavior exhibited by states in prosperous and slow periods of economic 
growth has a major impact on the financial conditions post-secondary institutions face. 
State revenue represents a substantial portion of public agency budgets, and the state’s 
ability to meet that support level each fiscal year weighs heavily on an institution’s ability 
to maintain service levels.  
 During periods of economic prosperity, the budget request mechanism employed 
by the central state agency affects higher education funding levels. However, in times of 
fiscal restraint, the effect of the central agency diminishes and institutions are forced to 
manage current service levels with decreasing state assistance. They can manage this 
change by creating new methods of providing service, cutting back on expenditures, or 
institutional reorganization.  
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 The ability to manage this change increases in significance as enrollment patterns 
continue their upward trend, the college age population is growing, and expenses are 
increasing. The exodus of the Recovery Act funds in 2011 creates a considerable 
structural imbalance in the majority of state budgets, which will disproportionately 
impact higher education spending as postulated by Hovey (1999) and confirmed by the 
substantial funding decrease observed in this analysis. Both the state agency and budget 
request mechanism have smaller effects in times of fiscal constraint, which the academy 
must recognize.  
Recommendations on fiscal management during an economic crisis would include 
public institutions and/or states preparing a list of funding priorities that are reflected in 
the appropriations and expenditure processes. By assuring these priorities are met, states 
and institutions can assess the ability to accomplish their primary mission. Additionally, 
planning and management of an institutional strategic reserve is paramount in sustaining 
periods of slow economic growth. Institutions can establish agreements with state fiscal 
authorities for a share in the states strategic reserve for funding priorities set by both 
parties.   
Further Research 
 It would be short sighted to recommend all states move to a funding formula 
model. State agencies and institutions prioritize and balance changes in higher education 
with appropriate funding levels. It is naïve to conclude that one funding mechanism 
would maximize outcomes for all states. Further research should be conducted on which 
of the budget mechanism factors have the greatest effect on the total appropriations 
request (enrollment, instruction, faculty salary, etc). Additionally, drilling down the 
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statutory differences within the agency categories may yield interesting results. By 
adding these new variables to the model, the level of influence each variable has is 
subject to change.  
 A second consideration for future research is the process by which these budget 
mechanisms evolved. State institutions have reason to be very protective over their 
current funding levels and negotiations regarding a change in the methodology may be 
met with resistance. Institutions will likely remain steadfast to a “hold harmless” 
requirement throughout any type of negotiation in order to protect the base level of 
funding to which they are accustomed. The historical perspective on circumstances under 
which the current budget mechanism was developed may provide information on the 
aspects of higher education important to the state’s fiscal authority.  
 Finally, the effects and behavior exhibited by states and post-secondary 
institutions throughout the life of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act may 
provide valuable insight on federal, state, and institutional behavior during a recession. 
The funding priorities of states and institutions would be of particular interest during this 
time and should be continually studied to measure the future impacts of the substantial 
one-time federal investment.  
Conclusion 
 Public post-secondary institutions have a profound impact on improving 
economic development opportunities, slowing the rising cost of healthcare, and 
increasing the quality of life for the general public. State assistance of these institutions is 
paramount to that mission. Research presented here indicates a relationship between the 
appropriations request mechanism and the level of state assistance for higher education in 
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strong and restrained periods of economic growth. Observance of this relationship is 
important to the administration of operations and fiscal priorities of public post-
secondary institutions. Implications associated with findings on state fiscal behavior are 
increasingly relevant to state programs considering the departure of federal funds 
provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The ability to operate in the 
post-Recovery Act era is predicated on state agency’s understanding of what to expect.  
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